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Abstract: Almost twenty years ago the Maastricht Treaty introduced procedures for 
European Social Dialogue, as part of a larger package of measures to strengthen the social 
dimension of European integration. Through the Treaty provisions (articles 154-155 Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union), the European social partners received the 
competence to become, in principle, co-regulators of the European labour market. The 
conventional reading of the evolution of European social dialogue since its inception is that it 
has evolved from a relationship of dependency of the European social partners on the 
European institutions for the implementation of their framework agreements, towards a more 
autonomous position in which the social partners themselves take charge of implementation. 
Since the early 2000s, the argument continues, the social partners have taken a more proactive 
and independent stance and opted to focus on autonomous framework agreements, and other 
‘new generation texts’, including joint reports, recommendations, compendia of good 
practices, etc., which are not directed at the European institutions in order to secure 
implementation. In this paper we want to challenge and move beyond this rather linear and 
one-dimensional conceptualisation of the evolution of European social dialogue. Empirically, 
we will show that there has not been a straightforward move away from the ‘implementation 
through Directive’ mode in favour of autonomous agreements.  Whereas this may seem the 
case if we take a view of the cross-sector dialogue only, the picture changes when we have a 
closer look and include developments in the European sector social dialogue in the analysis. 
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Analytically, we will argue that framing the issue in terms of dependency or autonomy does 
not do justice to the complexity of relationships that are involved in the European social 
dialogue and the European sector social dialogue, and in the implementation of framework 
agreements and other new generation texts. Also it accords little attention to the role of power 
in the relationships involved. We draw on a multi-governance perspective to analyse the 
dynamics of European social dialogue, which allows us to capture the relevant multiple 
horizontal and vertical relationships, or interdependencies, between the European and 
national, and public and private, actors involved. Interdependency implies the presence of 
both autonomy and dependence in a relationship, and our central proposition is that these 
interdependencies simultaneously enhance and limit the capacity of the European social 
partners to make and implement agreements. 
Keywords: cohesion policy; structural funds; fiscal federalism; multilevel Governance; 
lobbying; political economy; methodological issues; political science. 
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Introduction 
Almost twenty years ago the Maastricht Treaty introduced procedures for European Social 
Dialogue, as part of a larger package of measures to strengthen the social dimension of 
European integration. Through the Treaty provisions (articles 154-155 TFEU), the European 
social partners received the competence to become, in principle, co-regulators of the 
European labour market. Two principle modes of governance were institutionalised. First, the 
European social partners have the right to negotiate framework agreements and then jointly 
request the Commission to start a process to convert these agreements into EU Directives 
such that they become formally incorporated into law. Secondly, they can conclude so-called 
autonomous framework agreements, the enforcement of which is not dependent on the 
European institutions but is their own responsibility. According to article 155 TFEU, 
implementation of these autonomous agreements should be in accordance with the procedures 
and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States. These two modes of 
governance apply both to the cross-sector European social dialogue (ESD) which involves the 
peak level European social partners, and the European sector social dialogue (ESSD), which 
today concerns some 40 sectors. 
The conventional reading of the evolution of European social dialogue since its inception is 
that it has evolved from a relationship of dependency of the European social partners on the 
European institutions for the implementation of their framework agreements, towards a more 
autonomous position in which the social partners themselves take charge of implementation 
(Branch 2005; Smismans 2008; Clauwaert 2011). It is argued that in the second half of the 
1990s several framework agreements were negotiated by the European social partners in the 
‘shadow of hierarchy’ of the European Commission (Smismans 2008) and implemented 
through EU Directives. This pointed to a double dependency on the EU institutions: first on 
the ‘threat of legislation’ to reach an agreement and second on EU Directives to get it 
implemented. Since the early 2000s, the argument continues, the social partners have taken a 
more proactive and independent stance and opted to focus on autonomous framework 
agreements, concluded under TFEU articles 154 and 155, and other ‘new generation texts’, 
including joint reports, recommendations, compendia of good practices, etc., which are not 
directed at the European institutions in order to secure implementation. Autonomous 
agreements and other new generation texts are often considered to be ‘soft’ forms of 
governance since they do not rely on ‘hard’ European legislation. They are also taken as an 
indication of growing social partner autonomy since they rely on the social partners 
themselves for implementation (Weber 2010).  
In this paper we want to challenge and move beyond this rather linear and one-dimensional 
conceptualisation of the evolution of European social dialogue. Empirically, we will show 
that there has not been a straightforward move away from the ‘implementation through 
Directive’ mode in favour of autonomous agreements.  Whereas this may seem the case if we 
take a view of the cross-sector dialogue only, the picture changes when we have a closer look 
and include developments in the ESSD in the analysis. Analytically, we will argue that 
framing the issue in terms of dependency or autonomy does not do justice to the complexity 
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of relationships that are involved in ESD and ESSD, and in the implementation of framework 
agreements and other new generation texts. Also it accords little attention to the role of power 
in the relationships involved. We draw on a multi-governance perspective to analyse the 
dynamics of European social dialogue, which allows us to capture the relevant multiple 
horizontal and vertical relationships, or interdependencies, between the European and 
national, and public and private, actors involved. Interdependency implies the presence of 
both autonomy and dependence in a relationship, and our central proposition is that these 
interdependencies simultaneously enhance and limit the capacity of the European social 
partners to make and implement agreements. We will show that the implementation of so-
called autonomous agreements entails multiple relations of dependency on national social 
partners and governments that limit the autonomy of the European social partners.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 1 we discuss the added value a multi-level 
governance approach has for the analysis of European social dialogue, as well as the 
limitations of such an approach. In section 2 we present the horizontal and vertical 
relationships involved in ESD and ESSD. Section 3 summarises the types of agreements made 
to date under ESD and EESD to establish if a shift from dependent to autonomous agreements 
has taken place. Section 4 draws on secondary sources and existing literature to examine the 
experience with the autonomous agreements under the ESD from a multi-level governance 
perspective while section 5 does the same with the new generation joint texts of the ESSD. 
The final section presents conclusions. 
1. Dependency and autonomy in European social dialogue:  
A multi-level governance perspective 
In this section we will address the question if autonomous agreements provide the European 
social partners with increased autonomy compared to the dependency inherent in the 
implementation of agreements through Directives. Autonomy here refers to self-government, 
to the possibility for a group, here the European social partners, to govern the actions of their 
own members through a collectively elaborated system of rules without the intervention from 
an external authority over which they cannot exercise control. In the case of agreements 
implemented through Directives this external authority refers to the European institutions 
involved in adopting such Directives, most importantly the European Commission and the 
European Council. These external actors are indispensable for the transformation of a 
framework agreement into legal rules and hence its implementation, something which the 
European social partners cannot do by themselves. Hence, in this sense they become 
dependent on the European institutions, which seems to limit their autonomy. In the case of 
autonomous agreements the European social partners do not depend on the European 
institutions for implementation. This then seems to increase their autonomy. But is this really 
the case? To better understand these questions a multi-level governance perspective is 
required to get a grip on the relationships involved in European social dialogue and the 
implementation of its outcomes. 
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1.1. European social dialogue as multi-level governance 
Because it captures essential features of contemporary European industrial relations, a multi-
level governance perspective has considerable analytical potential for understanding the 
development of the European social dialogue as well as European industrial relations more 
generally (Leisink and Hyman, 2005; Marginson and Sisson, 2004). Multi-level governance is 
both an ‘outcome’ of the effects of European integration on industrial relations, but it is also 
an intervening variable. As such it provides industrial relations actors who are grappling with 
the challenges and consequences of European integration with multiple options for regulatory 
intervention (and innovation), and choices between these. At the same time, applying a multi-
level governance perspective to the European social dialogue holds the promise of 
contributing to the elaboration of the underlying concept. Analysis of the choices made by 
industrial relations actors in the face of multiple options invites consideration of power 
relations. Yet, ‘the [multi-level] governance approach … has a strong bias towards effective 
and efficient problem-solving, and almost completely ignores questions of political power’ 
(Jachtenfuchs (2001) cited by Leisink and Hyman (2005: 279).  
What, then, are the potential, and limitations, of the concept of multi-level governance for 
analysing European social dialogue? Originating in political science and European studies, 
two linked developments underpinned its elaboration as a conceptual framework: the 
emergence of new levels of governance at supra-national level, including the EU, and the 
associated tendency of sub-national - regional and territorial - governmental authorities to by-
pass national government when dealing with the supranational institutions (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001); and the growing role of non-state actors in policy decision-making (Rhodes, 
2000). Accordingly, the multi-level governance concept contains both vertical and horizontal 
dimensions. Vertically it refers to increased interdependence between governance 
mechanisms at different levels, whilst horizontally it refers to growing interdependence 
between governmental (public) and non-governmental (private) actors (Marks and Hooghe, 
2004).  
In terms of ‘multi-level’, the relevance to European social dialogue is readily apparent. 
European social dialogue as it developed after 1992 is in addition to, and does not displace, 
forms of social dialogue at national and sub-national levels. Moreover, multiple EU-levels are 
involved – cross-sector, sector and (multinational) European-scale company – with multiple 
linkages to national and sub-national levels. In this paper we focus on the cross-sector and 
sector dimensions of European social dialogue. 
Concerning ‘governance’, the distinction typically made between government and governance 
(Jessop, 2004; Sisson, 2007) helps establish the relevance of the concept. Unlike government, 
governance is not nationally-bound, and involves the supra-national and also the sub-national. 
Governance involves private institutions, which may be associations or individual 
organisations (e.g. corporations) as well as the public institutions of government. It therefore 
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involves a range of social actors as well as the public authorities1
Specific features of the EU context, and of that framing European social dialogue, accentuate 
the relevance of the multi-level governance concept. As Leisink and Hyman (2005) observe, 
the EU has no executive apparatus of government, which raises uncertainty over who is the 
agent of governance and simultaneously creates scope for a range of private and public actors 
to exercise governance functions, including the social partners through European social 
dialogue. Second, the relationship between authority at the EU level and that at the national 
level is non-hierarchical, focusing attention on interaction between levels (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001). Reflecting this, the EU does not possess a vertically integrated industrial 
relations system which mirrors the national arrangements found in the majority of the former 
EU-15. The corollary for European social dialogue is that there is no necessary relationship 
with forms of social dialogue at national and sub-national levels; the nature and extent of any 
interaction becomes crucial. Given this, attention needs to be paid to bottom-up dynamics, 
from national and sub-national levels to the European, as well as top-down ones. Third, is the 
diversity in industrial relations institutions and governance arrangements across the member 
states, which has increased noticeably following the 2004 and 2007 eastern enlargements. An 
implication of such differences on the horizontal plane is that they shape the nature and extent 
of interactions between the European and national and sub-national levels. For example, the 
possible dynamics between the European level and the national level will differ if in a specific 
country the coverage rate of collective agreements is high or low, since this determines the 
capacity of the national level social partners to implement agreements in their national context 
through such collective agreements.   
.  Regulation can be 
negotiated (via associations) or unilateral (via corporate hierarchies) as well as legally-
framed. Linkages between levels are not necessarily hierarchical, and links – or ‘coupling’ – 
between them tends to be loose rather than tight. In addition, the multi-level governance 
literature exhibits a focus on changing forms of governance, and associated scope for 
experimentation and innovation (Léonard et al., 2007). This includes changes in the nature 
and use of ‘traditional’ forms (see Barbier and Colomb in this special issue), including legal 
enactment and collective agreement, and the emergence of newer forms, such as ‘soft’ forms 
of joint regulation, including framework agreements and joint texts associated with European 
social dialogue, and the ‘open method of coordination’ (OMC) associated with EU 
employment and social policy (see Hartlapp in this special issue).  
In combination, these contextual features help account for the role of European social 
dialogue in experimenting with and developing some of the newer forms of governance on 
which the multi-level governance literature has focused. These include both the ‘harder’ 
binding agreements, which entail unparalleled rights for private actors in drawing up 
                                               
 
1 Cf the work of authors like Hollingsworth, Crouch and Streeck (e.g. Crouch 2005; Hollingsworth and Boyer 
1997; Hollingsworth et al. 1994). They argue in a broader way that economic action is co-ordinated through a 
series of coexisting modes of governance, ranging from the state and the market, to micro-hierarchies (firms, 
organisations), networks, associations and community. 
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generally applicable measures, and ‘softer’ measures such as joint texts and autonomous 
agreements. 
1.2. Limitations of the multi-governance approach 
If the multi-level governance concept has evident potential for comprehending European 
social dialogue, under its current formulation it also has limitations. Chief amongst these is 
the absence of consideration of power relations. Accounting for the rise of multi-level 
governance as a prominent characteristic of contemporary European political systems, Marks 
and Hooghe’s (2004) explanation is essentially based on the notion of scale efficiencies, 
augmented by democratic considerations. Their efficiency rationale is situated in the varying 
scope of the externalities arising from the provision of public goods. These can range from 
being global in scale, as in the case of climate change, to local in scale, as with municipal 
services. The scale of governance needs to reflect the varying scope of these externalities: 
accordingly, multi-level arrangements will be more efficient than a single level of 
governance. By implication, multi-level governance will also involve a separation of 
competencies across levels. However, under a different line of transactions cost reasoning, 
competency on any given issue can be distributed across levels. A prime instance in European 
industrial relations is ‘organised decentralisation’ (Traxler, 1995). This involves a centrally 
framed solution, or ‘steer’, which maps out the main principles but leaves the details to be 
determined at other levels, according to national and/or local circumstances. In this way the 
local parties do not each incur the transactions costs of drawing up the main principles of a 
solution, whilst also avoiding the those arising from central specification of the details and 
mode of implementation. Put another way, similarity of interest on the issues of principle co-
exists with differences of interest on the details and modes of implementation. Concerning the 
European social dialogue, the option of implementation through national procedures and 
practices under Article 155 TFEU could be viewed as corresponding to this logic. 
The democratic considerations identified by Marks and Hooghe (2004) relate to the enhanced 
capacity of multi-level arrangements to reflect heterogeneity of preferences amongst citizens, 
and to the benefits that may derive in terms of innovation and experimentation from having 
multiple governance units at any given level. Yet as Regalia (2007) observes, democratic – or 
participation – advantages of multi-level governance do not necessarily equate with efficiency 
in economic terms, as they may increase overall transactions costs. For instance, the 
legitimacy of measures may be enhanced by the involvement in the governance process of 
(more) actors at more levels, although the more complex procedural arrangements which this 
requires necessarily increases transactions costs. In turn, this alludes to the role of power 
relations within multi-level governance arrangements.  
The evolving multi-level framework of governance in European industrial relations presents 
actors with multiple options for regulatory interventions both horizontally (different 
combinations of private and/or public actors) and vertically (various levels). Actors’ choices – 
or manoeuvres - may well be informed by the efficiency and democratic considerations 
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outline above, but they will also be informed by power ones. Advantages can be secured in 
terms of power relations by pursuing one option rather than another. Moreover, the actors 
involved have differing power resources.  
It follows that governance arrangements may well become a focus for contestation between 
the parties, as each strives to secure advantage. The optional European framework for 
transnational collective bargaining, proposed by the European Commission in the Social 
Agenda 2006-2010 provides an example of such contestation (see Keune and Warneck 2006). 
The European Commission proposed to develop such a framework to provide for the 
possibility to conclude transnational collective agreements at either enterprise level, i.e. in 
multinationals with companies in more than one EU country, or sectoral level, i.e. covering a 
certain sector in multiple EU countries. Its objective was to provide an innovative governance 
tool adapted to the increasingly transnational character of economic activity and labour 
relations and give legal status to transnational collective agreements. Within the context of the 
ESD the Commission started a consultation process with the European social partners on the 
issue. The European trade unions initially regarded the initiative with a certain degree of 
scepticism, but after internal debate, the unions by and large support it, arguing that it will 
increase their capacity to act at this ever more important level. They did set out a number of 
basic conditions the framework should meet. From the outset, however, the European 
employers argued against a measure since it aimed to facilitate collective bargaining above 
the national level. As such it was contrary to established employer preferences favouring 
further decentralisation of collective bargaining and, more generally, against further legal 
regulation of industrial relations. The employers’ contestation of the initiative proved to be 
powerful enough to force the Commission to shelve its plans.  
There may also be differences in preferences between the actors at European and national or 
local level, which will impinge both on the mandate to negotiate any European agreement and 
on its subsequent implementation, questions to which we return below. Alternatively, moves 
by actors in one sphere of governance may be connected to securing change in others. For 
example, the European Metalworkers Federation (EMF) developed its initiatives in cross-
border bargaining coordination in the first instance to strengthen the bargaining position of 
metal workers unions; however, an additional rationale for EMF’s initiative appears to have 
been to place indirect pressure on the Council of European Employers of the Metal, 
Engineering and Technology-Based Industries (CEEMET) to change its stance on engaging in 
European social dialogue for the sector (Marginson and Sisson, 2004).  
The scope for, and reality of, contestation underlines that there is no shared vision of the 
governance arrangements that should prevail within Europe’s multi-level industrial relations 
framework. A further corollary is that the pattern of governance within this multi-level 
framework may not be consistent, as according to a calculus of power advantage, local 
solutions are opted for on some issues, national on others and supranational on further ones. 
Put differently, multi-level governance arrangements are themselves a source of governance 
uncertainty, but also offer multiple options or solutions that can be pursued by the different 
actors involved.  
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Introducing power relations into the multi-governance framework has implications for the 
evaluation of dependency and autonomy. Power relations are always two-directional, 
involving autonomy and dependency for both sides, even where power is distributed unevenly 
Giddens (1979). A consequence of this is that severing a relationship of dependency may 
implicate a loss of autonomy as well. In the case of European social dialogue, dependence on 
the European institutions to implement the outcome of negotiations via a Directive at the 
same time implies autonomy for the European social partners in relation to their national 
affiliates in order to realise implementation. The autonomy the European social partners attain 
through taking responsibility for implementing the agreements they conclude at the same time 
increases their dependence on their national affiliates. For instance, national affiliates which 
were reluctant to agree a mandate for a given negotiation are now also in a position to 
frustrate its implementation.  
2.  Multi-level governance and European social dialogue 
Drawing on above analysis leads us to consider European (sector) social dialogue as a 
constellation of horizontal and vertical relationships as pictured in Figure 1. At the horizontal 
(EU) level ESD and EESD first of all concern horizontal relationships between European 
cross-sector and sector employers’ organisations and trade unions. From the dynamics 
between these two sides, framework agreements (and other texts) may result. As mentioned 
earlier, two types of horizontal dependency relations with the European institutions are of 
importance. One is that the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ may play a crucial role in agreements 
coming about in the first place. Second, the European institutions are needed if the social 
partners want to achieve the transformation of their agreement into a Directive. In addition, a 
more basic dependency exists between the private actors which constitute the ESD and ESSD 
on the one hand and the EU’s public institutions, in particular the European Commission, on 
the other. Both the ESD and the ESSD are dependent on the Commission for the resources 
that makes their functioning possible in the first place. The Commission finances their 
meetings, studies and other activities without which ESD and ESSD committees would not be 
able to meet and operate. In the ESSD the dependence on the Commission has an additional 
dimension, concerning the mix of private and public actors involved (Léonard 2008). In 
formal terms, the ESSD is – like the ESD -  a bi-partite process involving private actors. Yet 
public authority, in the form of the Commission, is deeply implicated in its functioning. The 
establishment of ESSD in any given sector is dependent on Commission authorisation, 
according to criteria established by the Commission.  
The vertical concerns relationships between the ESD-ESSD and the member state level. In 
formal (de jure) terms, the ESD relies on national (cross-sector) social partners for the 
mandate to engage in a European-level negotiation and, in the case of autonomous 
agreements, the subsequent implementation of the resulting outcome.  In equivalent vein, the 
ESSD relies on the sector social partners at national level in respect of mandate to negotiate 
and subsequent implementation (if relevant). Yet, the relationship between the European and 
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national social partners is non-hierarchical and, as established above, there is no top-down 
articulation mechanism. Indeed, social partners at the national level may have different 
preferences or priorities to their European counterparts. Hence, implementation is not 
guaranteed and ESD and ESSD are dependent on the cooperation, preferences and resources 
of national level actors that they cannot exercise control over and that will differ substantially 
across the EU.   
Figure 1: European social dialogue – European sector social dialogue as  
multi-level governance 
 
Moreover, de facto, the national social partners directly implicated by an autonomous 
agreement emanating from the ESD or ESSD, respectively, may be reliant on actions by other 
parties not involved in the process to secure implementation. Whether, and to what extent, 
this is the case depends on national institutional arrangements, which vary considerably. 
Under the ESD such a situation may arise where there is no institutional capacity or formal 
competence for negotiation at national, cross-sector level, and implementation rests on the 
actions of social partner organisations at sector level, or the parties at company level. Under 
the ESSD, the equivalent situation arises where there is no institutional capacity for 
negotiation at sector level nationally, and implementation rests on the actions of the parties at 
company level. In either instance, national social partners turn to their national governments 
and request them to implement agreements through national legislation; a request to which 
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governments may or may not respond favourably2
From this analysis we can conclude that insofar as autonomous agreements increase the 
autonomy of the European social partners in respect of the European institutions, that they 
also entail relationships of dependency for their implementation, on social partners and 
governments in the member states. This seriously questions the prevailing reading of the 
evolution of the European social dialogue as moving from dependency to autonomy, 
something which is reinforced by the following section’s review of the trajectory of 
agreements concluded under the ESD and ESSD. In the next section we will examine if there 
is indeed a shift from dependent to autonomous agreements. We then turn to demonstrate the 
potential of a multi-level governance perspective in informing analysis of the dynamics of the 
ESD and ESSD with a more empirical illustration of the issues discussed above. For the 
cross-sector level we will focus on the experiences with the autonomous agreements, whereas 
at the sector level we will examine the experiences with the new generation joint texts. 
.  National implementation may also have 
to rely on specialised national agencies like occupational insurance bodies or labour 
inspectorates.  
3. From dependent to autonomous agreements? 
A first issue to be resolved is if there is indeed a move from agreements implemented by 
Directives to autonomous agreements. Table 1 provides an overview of the agreements 
resulting from ESD and ESSD. Where the ESD is concerned, three Directives were adopted 
based on framework agreements in 1996, 1997 and 1999, while in 2009 an agreement was 
negotiated to revise the 1996 Directive on parental leave. Four autonomous agreements have 
been agreed, all in the 2000s. At first sight, this indeed suggests a move from a practice of 
implementation of ESD agreements through Directives to one of autonomous agreements. 
The 2009 agreement on the parental leave Directive to some extent contradicts such a trend, 
even though it concerns the revision of an earlier agreement. However, for the moment only 
four agreements of either type have been concluded and the conclusion of one further 
agreement to be implemented through a Directive would fatally undermine the linear 
portrayal.  
Moreover, the picture changes substantially when we consider also the EESD. Here six 
agreements have been implemented through Directives in the period 1998-2011 and six 
through the national procedures and practices mechanism. Yet two of the most recent 
framework agreements, concluded in 2009 and 2010 respectively, have both been 
implemented through a Directive. In short, there is no evidence of any shift from binding to 
autonomous agreements under the ESSD. Hence, taking the ESD and ESSD agreements 
together in terms of the number of agreements concluded, we cannot speak of a clear trend 
                                               
 
2 In such a national adoption process it is of course possible that actors renegotiate the original agreement to 
some extent. 
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from agreements implemented through a Directive to autonomous agreements. In terms of 
scope, it might argued that the Directives emerging from the ESSD are of less importance 
since they each cover only a small part of the economy and labour market. Nonetheless the 
ESSD experience clearly indicates that in the future we may expect new Directives to emerge 
from framework agreements.   
Table 1: Framework agreements resulting from European social dialogue–  
European sector social dialogue 
 
  
Cross-sector ESD 
 
Agreements implemented by Council Directive 
- Framework agreement on parental leave (revised) (2009) 
- Framework agreement on fixed-term contracts (1999) 
- Framework agreement on part-time work (1997) 
- Framework agreement on parental leave (1996) 
  
Autonomous agreements 
- Framework agreement on inclusive labour markets (2010) 
- Framework agreement on harassment and violence at work (2007) 
- Framework agreement on work-related stress (2004) 
- Framework agreement on telework (2002) 
 
Sector ESD 
 
Agreements implemented by Council Directive 
- Framework agreement on prevention from sharps injuries in the hospital and healthcare 
sector (2010) 
- Framework agreement on the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006, and amending Directive 
1999/63/EC (2009) 
- Framework agreement on certain aspects of the working conditions of mobile workers 
engaged in interoperable cross-border services in the railway sector (2005) 
- Framework agreement on the Organisation of Working Time of Mobile Workers in Civil 
Aviation (2000)  
- Framework agreement on the organisation of working time of seafarers (1999) 
- Framework agreement on some aspects of working time of rail workers (1998) 
 
Autonomous agreements 
- Framework agreement on competence profiles in the chemicals industry (2011) 
- Framework agreement on the implementation of European hairdressing certificates (2009) 
- Framework agreement on the reduction of workers’ exposure to the risk of work-related 
musculo-skeletal disorders in agriculture (2006) 
- Framework agreement on workers’ health protection through the good handling and use of 
crystalline silica and products containing it, 14 industrial sectors (2006) 
- Framework agreement on the European licence for drivers carrying out a cross-border 
inter-operability service (2004) 
- European agreement on vocational training in agriculture (2002) 
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4. EU cross-sector social dialogue: Autonomous agreements  
Experience of the negotiation and implementation of the autonomous agreements on 
teleworking (2002) and work-related stress (2004) concluded under the European cross-sector 
social dialogue3
Interaction between the European and national levels occurs at different stages of the Article 
154-155 negotiation and implementation procedures: the framing of the substantive 
negotiations; the procedural decision between the two possible implementation routes under 
Article 155 (giving an agreement binding force via a Directive or invoking ‘national 
procedures and practices’); and the subsequent implementation of autonomous agreements 
within member states. The framing of the negotiations requires national member organisations 
to give their respective European social partners a mandate to negotiate on the issue in 
question. On telework, negotiations were prompted by proposals originally initiated by the 
Commission. The incentive for the social partners to contemplate negotiated European-level 
regulation on this, and the subsequent topics of work-related stress and workplace violence 
and harassment, probably lies in their status as newer industrial relations issues which are not 
(yet) subject to comprehensive regulation at national level. There are transaction costs 
advantages for national employer organisations and trade unions in framing a common 
approach at European level, and avoiding the additional resources involved in developing 
parallel initiatives in each member state (Léonard et al., 2007; Marginson and Sisson, 2004). 
In the case of teleworking, the reasons why the social partners opted to negotiate with a view 
to implementation via the hitherto unused ‘national procedures and practices’ route reflected 
power, but also other considerations. According to Larsen and Andersen (2007), 
BusinessEurope (then UNICE) and CEEP would not countenance a binding agreement, whilst 
ETUC was initially divided between one group of affiliates which sought a binding agreement 
and another which preferred an autonomous agreement. The choice of implementation 
method, however, seems also to have ‘reflected social partners’ common wish to achieve 
increased autonomy from the European Commission and to show that they still had a role to 
play despite their failed attempt to reach an agreement on agency work [in 2001]’ (Larsen and 
Andersen, 2007: 184).  
 underscores the challenges posed by non-hierarchical multi-level governance 
arrangements in framing and enacting measures which have the effects intended. Of particular 
interest from a multi-level governance perspective are the consequences and problems arising 
from the coupling of the European and national levels involved in Article 155’s 
implementation mechanism via ‘national procedures and practices specific to management 
and labour and the Member States’. 
As a coupling mechanism, the ‘national procedures and practices’ implementation route is – 
by design – framed so as to accommodate diverse forms of implementation across countries, 
                                               
 
3 Reports on the implementation of the 2007 agreement on harassment and violence at work have yet to become 
available; whilst the 2010 agreement on inclusive labour markets has yet to become the focus of any evaluation 
of its implementation.  
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reflecting the diversity of national industrial relations arrangements. From a multi-level 
governance perspective the mechanism is consistent with the efficiency principle 
underpinning ‘organised decentralisation’ within national systems (Traxler, 1995): the central 
actors agree on the principles and/or provide a steer, and leave decisions on the detail and 
implementation – which because of national diversity and therefore complexity risk 
jeopardising central-level agreement on the principles - to actors at lower levels. Consistent 
with this, both the 2006 joint evaluation of the implementation of the teleworking agreement 
undertaken by the social partners and the European Commission’s own subsequent 
assessment find considerable variation in the mode of implementation amongst the 25 
member states concerned (implementation in Bulgaria and Romania was still underway) 
(European Commission, 2009: Table 5.2). The diversity apparent also points to differing 
mixes in terms of the respective roles of private actors – the social partners – and the public 
authorities. These different modes include national legislation, including incorporation in the 
Labour Code (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland); inter-sector collective agreements, 
subject to legal extension (e.g. Belgium, France); sector collective agreements (e.g. 
Denmark); joint guidelines intended to prompt sector- and/or company-level negotiations 
(Finland, Spain); drawing-up model company agreements (e.g. Germany – some sectors 
only); adoption of joint guidelines and codes of good practice (e.g. Sweden, UK). 
Considerable variation in implementation mode is also evident from both the social partners 
2008 joint evaluation of the implementation of the work stress agreement, and the European 
Commission’s (2011b) own subsequent evaluation report. Legislation was again the main 
implementing instrument in several member states (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland); 
binding inter-sector agreements featured in others, subject to legal extension (e.g. Belgium, 
France, Romania); joint recommendations intended to prompt sector- and/or company-level 
negotiations featured in two (Finland, Spain); adoption of joint guidelines and codes of good 
practice were adopted in several (e.g. Sweden, the UK). Whilst in almost all countries the 
preferred mode of implementation was the same for both agreements (European Commission, 
2011: Box 6.6), the fact that social partners in four countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Malta - have not reported on the implementation of either agreement underlines the 
dependence of the European social partners on the subsequent (in)action of their national 
affiliates.  
This diversity of modes of implementation is, however, only partly attributable to the 
diversity in what might normally be considered ‘national procedures and practices’ (Larsen 
and Andersen, 2007; Visser and Ramos Martin 2008; Deakin and Koukiadaki 2010; Prosser, 
2011). This draws attention to problems with operationalisation of ‘national procedures and 
practices’ as an implementation mechanism. Four kinds of problem have been identified 
(Larsen and Andersen, 2007; Prosser, 2007, 2011).  
First, are countries where the implementation mode adopted would seem to differ from 
conventional notions of the ‘national procedures and practices’ concerned. In this respect 
Larsen and Andersen cite Germany, where a mix of methods have been used, including sector 
collective agreements (e.g. local government and metalworking, corresponding to the 
conventional procedures and practices), drawing up model company agreements, joint 
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declarations and the adoption of guidelines, and Sweden, where joint guidelines agreed at 
cross-sector level encouraged, but did not require, the conclusion of sector-level collective 
agreements (seen as the conventional procedure and practice). Indirectly this raises the second 
problem, which particularly arises in countries where sector-level agreements are a 
cornerstone of labour market regulation. ‘National procedures and practices’ may rely largely 
on (sector-level) actors not involved in the negotiation and implementation of the autonomous 
agreement. Conversely, the cross-sector social partners who are directly implicated may not 
have domestic competence to conclude collective agreements. This applies to Denmark, as 
well as Germany and Sweden, where Prosser (2007) details how contestation arose between 
the national social partners over whether to conclude a cross-sector agreement recommending 
that their sector affiliates negotiate agreements. Ambiguities in the framing of the 
implementation mechanism thereby create scope for power relations to come into play. Third, 
Prosser (2007) goes onto show how these ambiguities were exacerbated by previous 
interaction between European and national levels, since in Denmark the practice of a cross-
sector ‘follow-up’ agreement, as eventually concluded in the case of telework, was itself 
introduced into the Danish system as a means of implementing earlier binding agreements.  
Fourth, are countries where national procedures and practices are not well-defined, leaving 
scope for contestation to emerge over implementation mode but also for choice and for 
innovation. Prosser (2011) cites the UK and many of the central east European member states 
as corresponding to this situation. These countries have neither strong national-level social 
dialogue structures and traditions, nor are sector-level collective agreements a central form of 
labour market regulation – either of which would constitute a well-defined national procedure 
and practice. Implementation of the teleworking and work-related stress agreements in the 
Czech Republic and Hungary was, at the request of the social partners, effected through the 
Labour Code. This choice was in fact consistent with established practice in both countries of 
social partner consultation over changes to the Labour Code. In contrast, in what amount to an 
innovatory departure, the UK social partners concluded advisory guidelines on both 
occasions. On both occasions, the views of the peak employers’ (CBI) and trade union (TUC) 
organisations differed: the TUC’s proposal for an inter-sector agreement was opposed by CBI 
on the grounds, amongst others, that there was no such tradition in the UK. The TUC was 
unable to mobilise the pressure required to secure its preferred course of action, and the 
alternative approach of agreeing non-binding guidelines – equally unfamiliar to UK tradition 
– was adopted (Prosser, 2011). Crucially, the absence of well-defined national practices and 
procedures meant that the national social partners in these countries face choices, which they 
exercised differently – with power relations shaping outcomes.   
In addition to the dependency relationship between the European social partners and their 
national affiliates which is central to the national procedures and practices implementation 
mechanism, consideration of problems arising in its operationalization bring to the fore the 
indirect dependencies depicted in Figure 1. These include sectoral employer and trade union 
organisations and also national governments.  
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Even if these various shortcomings in specifying the coupling between European and national 
levels were to be addressed (and it is not at all clear how the fourth, the absence of well-
defined national procedures and practices, might be dealt with), the effect on policy and 
practice within companies and organisations would continue to rely wholly within the 
province of national level actors, underlying the dependency of the European social partners 
on their national counterparts. On this issue, the 2005 multi-sector agreement on crystalline 
silica, concluded under Article 155, but which does not rely on the ‘national procedures and 
practices’ transposition and implementation mechanism, goes considerably further (European 
Commission, 2008; Léonard et al., 2007). Concluded between European employer and trade 
union federations representing 14 sectors, the agreement specifies a range of good practices to 
be implemented at sites across these sectors. To this end it directly implicates the company 
level in implementing and monitoring the agreement, through the establishment at each site of 
a joint monitoring committee comprised of employer and employee representatives charged 
with promoting the good practices identified in the agreement, and periodically reporting to 
the European-level parties. In this way, the coupling between the European and national 
levels by-passes the national (sectoral) organisations, reaching down instead to the local level.  
5. European sector social dialogue: New generation joint texts  
The experience of the ESSD points up the further challenges that are posed in giving effect 
within member states to regulatory initiatives which do not come under the negotiation and 
implementation provisions specified in the Treaty. Reviewing findings from two studies of 
the European sectoral social dialogue (ESSD), Léonard (2008) draws attention to two 
problematic features. First, concerning the governance potential of ESSD, Léonard reports 
that the social partners tend to hold rather different notions of the concept of ‘social dialogue’. 
Employers’ organisations tend to interpret dialogue as an exchange of views with a general 
presumption that it should not lead to regulation, whereas trade unions see dialogue as 
extending to negotiation and hold the aspiration that it may result in regulatory measures 
which have effects4
Second, is the relationship with national industrial relations structures, and the social partners’ 
national member organisations. Léonard highlights the nature of the coupling between 
national and European levels, which – as with the ESD - is non-hierarchical in nature being 
two-directional rather than top-down. ESSD committees are constrained in the scope of their 
agenda and their capacity to contemplate regulatory initiatives on the mandates that national 
member organisations are prepared to give them (as well as on the resources made available 
by these organisations, and by the Commission). In turn, transposition and effective 
implementation of any joint texts and agreements concluded by ESSDs ‘largely depends on 
. These differing perspectives are consistent with the idea of contestation 
over the role and outputs of these sector-level governance arrangements.  
                                               
 
4 This equally applies to the ESD. 
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domestic dynamics over which the European social partners have little influence’ (Léonard 
2008: 408).  
It is against this context that the period since 1998, when the ESSD was formally 
reconstituted by the Commission, has seen the emergence of ‘new generation joint texts’ 
characterised by increased emphasis on follow-up procedures involving monitoring and peer 
review, aimed at better ensuring transposition and effective implementation at national level 
(European Commission, 2004). According to the Commission, the development embraces 
both framework agreements concluded under Articles 154 and 155 – either binding or 
autonomous – and ‘process-oriented’ texts such as frameworks of action, codes of conduct 
and guidelines. Whilst it remains the case that no more than ten framework agreements  have 
been concluded under the ESSD (see Table 1.1), 55 process-oriented texts were concluded 
between 1999 and 2009 (Pochet et al., 2009; Weber, 2010), with the incidence accelerating 
over the period, although the number of committees also increased from 24 to 40 in this 
period. Six types of follow-up procedure, sometimes used in combination, are identified by 
Pochet et al. (2009) amongst the texts concerned, which vary in the extent of the obligation 
they introduce on member organisations to report on implementation. At the ‘harder’ end of 
the spectrum are annual or periodic written reports, which through transparency and peer 
review, entail the strongest obligation to demonstrate follow-up, whilst at the ‘softest’ end of 
the spectrum are presentations of good practice. Pochet et al. (ibid.) note that the extent of the 
follow-up obligation tends also to be related to the nature of the process-oriented text, being 
strongest for frameworks of action and least so for guidelines. 
In multi-level governance terms, these procedures aim, to differing extent, to tighten the 
coupling between European and national levels. Indeed, Léonard (2008) confirms such 
intention of on the part of the parties at European level: representatives of both employer and 
trade union federations interviewed saw transposition and effective implementation at 
national level as crucial for the long-term credibility of the ESSD. Yet practice would seem to 
fall some way short of intentions. In a study of ESSD in the electricity and commerce sectors, 
Weber (2010) concludes that inadequate ‘level linkages’ of two kinds are a major impediment 
to implementation of new generation texts in these sectors. Concerning the linkage between 
EU and national levels, she identifies the key role of the secretariats of sectoral European-
level trade union and employer organisations in informing and communicating with national 
affiliates, and in steering their implementation activity. However, such activity tends not to be 
reciprocated in the other direction: the European-level organisations encounter considerable 
difficulty in eliciting information from national affiliates when monitoring implementation. 
This relates to the nature of a second, horizontal, linkage at national level. Frequently 
awareness of ESSD is low or minimal, being confined to a single department or individual 
official in national affiliates. Put differently, ESSD would seem to remain detached from the 
mainstream activity of national social partner organisations.  
Insofar as the follow-up procedures have the effects intended these are likely to be more 
apparent in some countries than others, reflecting the diversity of industrial relations 
arrangements in any given sector across the EU. Attitudes to non-binding agreements and 
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texts are, for example, more positive amongst affiliates in Denmark, where collective 
agreements are not legally binding but widely upheld, than they are amongst their 
counterparts in Germany, where collective agreements are legally binding and non-binding 
texts tend to be viewed as optional (Weber, 2010). In those member states where sectoral 
structures for social dialogue and/or collective bargaining – and even member organisations - 
are weak or absent, including many of the central eastern European countries, but also the 
UK, the capacity to ensure transposition and implementation is evidently limited. In contrast, 
in those countries where sector social dialogue and/or collective bargaining are well 
established such capacity exists and can be mobilised, as, for example, evidenced by the 
negotiations prompted in several countries by the 2002 agricultural sector agreement on 
vocational training (Léonard, 2008).   
Conclusions 
The evolution of European social dialogue since its inception is often interpreted as a process 
that is moving from dependency on the European institutions, towards more autonomy based 
on autonomous agreements. In this paper we have shown that such a linear and one-
dimensional view does not correspond to either empirical reality or the complexity of 
relationships that constitute the European social dialogue and the negotiation and 
implementation of its agreements.  
Empirically, taking together the experience of the ESD and ESSD we cannot observe a trend 
away from agreements implemented by Directives and in favour of autonomous agreements. 
Even if the observation is confined to the ESD, the 2009 Directive giving effect to the revised 
parental leave agreement disrupts the trajectory which would constitute such a trend.  
Whilst the negotiation and implementation of autonomous agreements may entail more 
autonomy from the European institutions, we have shown that their implementation also 
involves new dependencies on social partners and governments in the member states, 
reflected in a wide diversity of modes of implementation. The dependency or autonomy 
dichotomy presented in the conventional reading is a false one: negotiated regulation 
emanating from the European social dialogue rests on two-directional relations, between the 
European and national levels involving autonomy and dependency at the same time. It also 
involves differing forms of horizontal interdependency between private actors – the social 
partners – and the public authorities according to the different institutional arrangements 
which prevail in member states. Further, implementation can also – in certain member states – 
rest on indirect dependencies in the shape of actors which are not directly implicated in the 
process, such as sectoral employer and trade union organisations. Power relations, which are 
conspicuously absent in the conventional reading, are integral to the playing out of the 
multiple interdependencies which characterize European social dialogue as a mode of 
governance.  
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Grounding our analysis in a multi-level governance perspective has enabled us to capture key 
features of the two-directional vertical and horizontal relationships which European social 
dialogue involves. These include the central implication of the non-hierarchical vertical 
relationship between the European and national levels, which renders implementation of 
autonomous agreements dependent on the variable institutional geometry of national 
industrial relations; and the ambiguities in the specification of the coupling between the 
European and national levels which have arisen in operationalizing the Treaty’s ‘national 
practices and procedures’ implementation provision. The analysis also indicates ways in 
which the horizontal and vertical planes of interdependency which epitomise multi-level 
governance interact. As compared to binding agreements implemented through a Directive, 
autonomous agreements entail less horizontal interdependency at the European level 
(dependence of the European social partners on the European institutions) but greater vertical 
interdependency between the European and national levels, and possibly also increased 
horizontal interdependency at national level to the extent that national governments are called 
on to act. The outcome of these interactions is not predetermined, but shaped by the 
preferences and power resources of the actors; contestation is an inherent feature of multi-
level governance arrangements, as our analysis has demonstrated. For this reason, multi-level 
governance arrangements are also a source of uncertainty in terms of the regulation that 
eventually results.   
 The central implication of our analysis of European social dialogue for existing 
conceptual work accounting for multi-level governance (e.g. Hooghe and Marks, 2001) flows 
from the attention accorded to power relations, and hence the interplay between autonomy 
and dependency, in shaping governance arrangements and outcomes. Insofar as multi-level 
governance arrangements provide actors with choices and attendant scope for manoeuvre, our 
analysis concludes that outcomes will be contested with actors deploying their respective 
power resources to secure relative advantage. Considerations of power, as well as those of 
transactional efficiency and democracy, are essential to understanding the dynamics of multi-
level governance arrangements.  
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